January ended as the most violent month in Puerto Rico's history, with 109 reported homicides, including five domestic violence cases, as of press time.
That is 33 more violent deaths than in January 2010.
But despite mounting criticism, the island’s top cop defended his anti-crime plan while at the same time admitting that the police overreacted in the incidents involving a student protest at the Capitol.
One thing that José Figueroa Sancha condemned was the alleged use of excessive force against the University of Puerto Rico students protesting in front of the Capitol on Thursday. “I would have not used that force on a female student. That does not mean that it was not according to the parameters, but it is something that I would have not done,” he said. Video film of the melée shows a policeman groping the breast of one female demonstrator which prompted intense reactions from the student movement. The police chief ordered an investigation into the matter and expects a full report in the coming weeks.
Figueroa Sancha quashed rumors that he would be fired or is about to resign amid constant criticism for his force that is under constant criticism for its apparent inaction. He mounted a vigorous defense of his crime-fighting initiatives and blamed the rise of deadly incidents on the degeneration of the social fabric on the island. “There has been a shift in the type of homicides we are experiencing. Crime rates, among what we call "organized crime," are down significantly this year. In fact, they has been down for the past two years. The problem is that we are now watching the rise of social crime,” Figueroa Sancha said.
The police superintendent stated that 49 of the 109 reported homicide cases, or 42 percent, are related to the social environment of the island. He cited as an example the high number of domestic violence deaths registered, six this month, and the case of the Florida man who burned to death six of his family members, as examples of the type of crime. “These types of crimes are hard to prevent because of their nature. It’s hard to stop a person from killing his or her partner. It’s also hard to stop a man who burns his family. These are new crimes,” Figueroa Sancha said.
For comparison, in 2010, 16 women died as a result of domestic violence, that’s 1.4 per month. If the current trend continues, more than 50 women will perish at the hands of their spouses.
Figueroa Sancha continued defending his plan to curb crime. “We can’t look at one aspect, such as the homicides, to measure if a plan is working or not. We have to look at the entire spectrum and when we do this, we see an across-the-board-reduction in crimes,” he said. Data provided by the police department for 2010 supports that reality for the island.
Out of the seven major crime categories, four showed a reduction last year in comparison to 2009. Aggravated assault was down 21 percent, rape cases reported a 33 percent decrease, burglary was down 12 percent, and robberies showed a 2 percent reduction. Three categories that increased during 2010 were armed robbery, up 10 percent, homicides, up 8 percent, and car theft, up 1 percent.
More at the PE Daily Sun
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Japanese Aircraft Carrier
When World War II broke out in 1941 with Japan surprisingly attacking the United States’ main Pacific Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese possessed the largest and most powerful aircraft carrier force in the world. Added to the sheer numbers of carrier platforms, the Japanese had developed the world’s largest and most complete naval air fleet. This was the arm of the military that Japanese Imperial officers believed would win the war for them. A thought augmented by the early streak of quick victories enjoyed by the Imperial Navy. These successions of quick conquest also gave the Japanese military the false hope that they could maintain their initial numerical advantage in deployable carriers over the US for a long run. An advantage that was hallowed when the war commenced and one that would last only a few months. The reality was that, although Japan outgunned the US and Great Britain in deployable flatbeds, they were not prepare to engage the US and, later, the UK in a battle of attrition. It was this attrition, and the fact that they could not replace their lost carriers or even more importantly, their experience aircrews; as promptly as the Americans could, that lead to the downfall of Japan’s carrier force.
Japan entered hostilities against the western democracies with the most powerful and flexible carrier force that world had seen. Seven completed fleet carriers (Hosho, Akagi, Kaga, Ryujo, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku) formed the backbone of the Imperial Navy’s power projection force. They also possessed the most experienced naval aviators in the world. It was this numerical as well as tactical advantage the made possible Japan’s early surge into the Pacific Theater. At the end, Japan lost all of those carriers, with the exeption of the Hosho, in combat operations during the war. These losses were hard to overcome by a relative backward industrial society such as the one Japan possessed. During the war, Japan only managed to design and develop four additional fleet carriers, while its main adversary, the United States managed to build 17 front line fleet flatbeds. It was this fact that spelled the demise of the Japanese Navy in WWII.
It is the intention of this article to paint a clear picture of the development and conception of the Japanese flatbeds fleet during the war with the US. The article hopes to leave the reader with detail information on all the Japanese aircraft carriers developed and deployed between 1941 and 1945. It will make emphasis on the carriers’ developmental history as well as their combat operations, right to the end of their service lives.
A Brief History
The Japanese carrier development program before the Great War resembled those of the United States and the U.K. Their view of sea-based aircrafts flying aloft for hours was perceived to be for strategic as well as tactical reconnaissance operations only, thus no new advantage could be gained by constructing a vessel to operate airplanes only. Big guns still dominated their ideas, same as in the US and Britain. It was not until late in 1912, when Japanese official embedded, with Royal Navy forces, began to seriously consider the seaplane tender ship as an offensive platform instead of just another recon unit. With this in mind, in mid 1913, a major conceptual experimentation took place within the Imperial Japanese Navy confines. They were able to re-fit an old transport ship, the Wakamiya Maru, with two seaplanes extenders. In the fall of that year, the floatplanes operating out of the Wakamiya participated with the whole Combine Japanese Fleet in maneuvering and detecting exercises. The outcome of the exercises was impressive. The Wakamiya was able to located and engage most of the over-the-horizon targets assigned to its zone of operations without the “sea-plane carrier” being spotted by the Fleet’s screening ships. Trials continued trough the early months of 1914. Again, the seaplane tender demonstrated a unique ability to project power beyond its visual engagement range. In late 1914, faith intervened to push the nascent Japanese aircraft carrier program one step closer towards achieving operational status: the War to End All Wars erupted in Europe.
In an attempt to display their newly acquire naval power, Japanese leaders decided to extract territories from the overextended Imperial German forces in the Pacific, they wanted German-held territory in the south west coast region of China. The Wakamiya was dispatched as part of a Japanese fleet element assigned to capture ports and facilities in the Chinese coast. Meanwhile, Japanese observes and naval liaison officers attached to the British Royal Navy began reporting on the British employment of sea-tendered aircrafts to spot and track German ships, especially U-boats, operating in the North Sea as well as the Atlantic Ocean. These reports, as well the Japanese Navy’s own experience with the Wakamiya, enabled Japan to formulate a new strategic vision for its main fleet that incorporated the carrier as one of its main features, instead of just using it as a complementary platform. In the 1918, as well as in the 1920 budget, Japan allocated a major portion for their Navy design and development funds into their carrier platforms. This decision was augmented by an agreement with the UK, where the former would render technical assistance to the Japanese in exchange for some basing rights along the Hong Kong sea route. The British assistance centered on naval aircraft profiles and combat tactics. Faith again intervened when in 1922 the Washington Naval Treaty provided a structural limit on the size of the world’s top naval powers. The new treaty also provided the guidelines for displace characteristics of new ships designs. A limit of 27,000 tons was placed on all of the signatories. Any ship under construction above those limits was permitted but up to 33,000 tons. The tonnage aspect relating to carrier vessels was established at 81,000 for Japan, a deficiency of 54,000 tons from their US and British counterparts. It was this limitation that historians had attributed as one of the causes of Japan’s bellicose behavior towards the US since the early 1930s. It’s worth pointing out that during the Japanese binding to the Treaty’s tonnage limitation they were continually circumventing the tonnage issue in an effort to maintain parity in carriers with America.
There’s another, more important point to be made about how the Japanese Navy interpreted the Treaty’s ramifications on its carrier program. Before Washington 1922, Japan was a forerunner in the development of combat tactics for carrier platforms. They were one of the early converts to carrier power projection, but they still relegated the carrier force as a second fiddle to the big guns of the once mighty battleships. The Treaty, with its overall tonnage limitation, was the turning point in Japan’s carrier program. From that moment on, Japanese leaders decided not to augment its existing fleet of battleships, instead, the carriers would become the center piece of a newly designed Imperial Navy. Japanese leaders knew that they could not match ship per ship the US, but with a numerical as well as tactical advantage in deployable flatbeds, they believed that they could, not only offset the US numerical superiority in capital ships, but in fact take the strategic advantage away from the Americans in the vast Pacific Ocean. The new strategic position adopted by Japan in direct response to the new realities imposed on it by the 1922 accords meant that their main axis of attack would originate from its carriers force instead of the traditional battleship alignment, thus, from that moment on the carrier became Japan’s main first strike weapon system. As such distinction merits, all available naval resources were, either placed on the carrier itself or allocated to the development of the carrier’s air complement. Capital ships like battleships, heavy and light cruisers still received a substantial amount of the budget, but the importance of the Japanese had cleared shifted to their new first strike platform: the aircraft carrier.
Carrier Profiles
1. Taiho Class (Great Phoenix)
The Taiho had the distinction of being Japan’s first carrier to be fitted with a redundant damage control system that would had enable the flatbed to operate at the same profile even if she was damaged. Taiho was also the first carrier developed by Japan to incorporate an armored flight deck area. The deck’s thickness was in the range of 75 to 80mm. The Japanese believed that this level of reinforcement would have allowed the deck to withstand hits from up to 1,000lbs of free fall bombs. An armored belt of 5.9” circled the hull structure. But, as with most of Japan’s other carriers design, the Great Phoenix lacked armored platting hangars, a design flaw that would prove to be fatal for the entire carrier fleet. Taiho design was comparable to that of the famous Shokaku-class, except that it incorporated a large Island structure similar to that founded on the original Hiyu design. The other major departure from the Shokaku design was that the Great Phoenix’s bow was enclosed instead of the open air bow on pass vessels. This was done in order to provide the Taiho with an improve sea going capabilities. This new bow arrangement allowed the Taiho to have a more robust (33%) hangar space available for ordinance and fuel storage. The Great Phoenix was designed with a low center of gravity to improve the ship’s seaworthiness. As a result, the carrier had only to hangar elevators, one in the aft and the other in the forward area. With only two designated hangar areas available, the Taiho did packed an impressive cargo of aircrafts. Up to 75 front line plus 10 reserve aircraft could be embarked on the ship.
The new aircraft carrier was fitted with the newly designed Type 98 antiaircraft (AA) gun. This new gun was a 100mm demon that can shot at ranges up to 21,300 yards. Six dual mounts housed three of these awesome guns on each side of the hull. Seventeen of the triple 25mm guns were placed around the flight deck as well as in the Island superstructure. The Taiho also carried the two of the new Japanese Type 21 radar array. One was paced atop of the island while the other lay in the lower aft section of the structure. Taiho was completed in March 1944 and immediately was transferred to the Imperial Navy’s Mobile Fleet based at Singapore, where it was assigned to take over the flag of the Mobile Fleet.
Carrier Specifications
Total Displacement 29,300tons
Hull Length 855’-0”
Beam Area 91’-0”
Draft Section 32’-0”
Top Operational Speed 33 knots
Combat Range 10,200 nautical miles
Crew Complement 1,751
Taiho first extended combat action saw her launching strike aircrafts against a US carrier fleet in the morning of June 19th, 1944, when she was hit by one torpedo from the USS Albacore. Originally, the officers of the Taiho though that the hit was superficial and that the carrier would be able to sustained until it reached port, but in reality, the impact was more profound. The impact wave of the hit cracked the main aviation fuel tanks in the forward elevator area. As the fuel began to mix with sea water, the carrier’s crew demonstrated their under training in damage control tasks, a weakness that had already proven fatal to many of their companions in other flatbeds. They opened all hatches around the ship’s two hangar areas in an attempt to steam the water flow. It was to no avail. Because just four hours after the impact, the damage control crew turned on all of the hangar’s extractor fans thus setting up a massive explosion the blew the sides of the hangars. At this moment, the resulting fires began to consolidate and a second, most violent explosion shook up the ship. The hull was compromised and power was lost. Two hours later, the ship buckle under its own weight finally sinking with around 400 men trapped below the rupture deck.
2. Unryu Class (Unryu, Amagi and Katsuragi)
The Unryu class had the distinction of being Japan’s last front line carrier design of the war. The Unryu was a departure from the advance Taiho class. With this class, Japan returned to its original carrier designs roots. Speed above armor and protection was the rule instituted on the Unryu. The Unryu class was an attempt to match carriers with the US. In fact, the whole class was a crash curse on carrier construction. In 1941, the Navy ordered the development of six new flatbeds as soon as possible. The time requirement prevented Japanese shipyards to maximize what they had learned on the Taiho and Shokaku classes. To maximize their construction, all of six the carrier’s proposed on this class were designed along the lines of the Hiryu class. The first three hulls were laid in mid 1942, while the next three were to be under construction by the autumn of 1943. Those three never made it out of the yard. When the program was terminated in the spring of 1945, these three units (Ikoma, Katsuragi and Kasagi) were nearly a three quarters up. There were initial speculation that if the class was able to perform adequately, eleven additional units would have been ordered.
The Unryu class boats possessed almost the same hull structure, armor plating and hangar space distribution of the Hiryu. Their only structural difference was the Island placement. In the new class, the Island was located forward on the starboard side of the ship. As with others Japanese carrier designs, only two elevators were fitted to the boats. Two main hangar areas were able to storage 57 operational planes with seven reserved units as backup. The carriers of this class were armed with the same Type 89 guns as in the Hiryu boat. Three of the 89s were placed on each side of the carrier’s upper hull area. Sixteen triple and three single fire 25mm antiaircraft guns were also fitted around the flatbed’s superstructure. An additional four triple and thirteen single 25s were installed, giving the Unryu class an impressive array of 76 AA guns. The class was also the first of its kind in Japan to carry six 28 barrel 4.7” rocket launchers for short range action. Another distinction for the carriers was that they were the first platforms to be incorporated with a radar system since its design. Two of the Type 13 radars arrays were installed. One at the island’s mainmast and the other on the four hinged radio antenna.
Carrier Specifications
Total Displacement: 17,150 tons Unryu
17,260 tons Katsuragi
17,460 tons Amagi
Hull Length 742’-0”
Beam Area 72’-0”
Draft Section 26’-0”
Top Operational Speed 34 knots (Katsuragi 33 knots)
Combat Range 8,000 nautical miles
Crew Complement 1,595
Of the three completed ships of the class, only one actually saw active combat. And that action only involved the ferrying of aircrafts and ammunition to the Japanese garrison in the Philippines during the last stages of the war. Unryu, the lead boat, was commissioned in August 1944 and immediately was assigned to the Mobile Fleet. In December she was tasked to carry airplanes into Manila Harbor. On the 9th, while in transit to the Philippines, the Unryu was spotted by the submarine USS Redfish. The Redfish proceeded to put two torpedoes into the port side of the carrier hitting the half-filed aviation fuel tanks. The ensuing explosion sent the boat to the bottom with nearly 1,350 of its crew compliment. The other two carriers, the Amagi and Katsuragi were commissioned in October 1944. Neither embarked on any ocean going travel, mostly because of Japan’s massive fuel shortages. In March 1945, the Amagi was lightly damage in an American raid on Kure. On July 25th, a more intense bombardment damaged the Amagi’s hull integrity and she sank within minutes. Amagi had the distinction of being the last Japanese carrier sunk in combat. Katsuragi, who also received heavy damage during the 24th raid, survived the war. She was issue to the Allies as reparation payment and was ultimately scrapped in the fall of 1946.
3. Shimano Class
The largest carrier built during World War II, Shinano would remain the biggest flatbed in the world until the US Navy deployed its first series of super carriers in the 1950s. Shinano was original conceived as the last of the Yamato class super battleships. Laid in May 1940, work of the battleship stopped by June 1942. In August the Japanese Navy decided that the era of the big gun wagons was over and, still coping with the losses suffered at Midway, decided to convert the Shinano to an aircraft carrier. Work on the conversion started in September. At the time, Japanese naval leaders envisioned a new role for the huge hulled ship: floating fortress. The Shinano would become the next step in the evolution of the aircraft carrier, Japanese commanders thought at the time. Aircrafts from small decked carriers as well as long range land based planes would use the Shinano as sort of refueling and re-supplying platform. Thus in the design of the ship’s structure, only one hangar deck area was implemented. This reduced the amount of planes, 47, that new flatbed could carry. These planes were primarily for self defense purposes.
The Shinano’s design closely resembled that of the Taiho’s. The ship’s was fitted with an armored flight deck of three inches. Two elevators served the hangar area which was divided into two separate compartments. The forward hangar area was only covered by shutters, while the rear area was completely enclosed. A huge island structure, with a slanted stack, was placed the same way as in the Taiho’s. A massive armored belt, over eight inches in thickness, covered the other hull area. Additional armored platting, 7.5 inches worth, was installed on the machinery and magazine’s areas. Two pairs of Type 89 AA were placed on the forward and rear areas of each hull side. Between 30 and 33 triple 25mm guns were mounted all around the deck area. Twelve short range rocket launchers were also added. Two Type 21 radar systems were placed on the ship. One in forward area of the island and the other in the aft. These were augmented by two additional Type 13 arrays. One installed on the mainmast and the other on the forward port side of the radio antenna.
Carrier Profile Characteristics
Total Displacement: 62,000tons
Hull Length 873’-0”
Beam Area 119’-0”
Draft Section 34’-0”
Top Operational Speed 27 knots
Combat Range 10,000 nautical miles
Crew Complement 2,400
Apart of being the largest carrier built at the time, Shinano had also the distinction of having the shortest life span of any carrier in WW II. Commissioned in the morning of November 18th, 1944, Shinano departed the Yokosuka docks on the 28th for final fittings at Kure. On the early hours of the 29th, she was torpedo by the USS Archerfish. Although the damage was not considered sever, the ship did not had its full complement of counter flooding and damage control systems. As the ship continued its voyage, the flooding, checked by the crew at first, began to overmatch the ship’s countermeasures. Power was lost and after eleven hours, the mighty ship capsized tanking with her 1,350 crewmembers.
In the end, Japan felt victim of what the saw before the war commenced as its biggest weakness: their small industrial base. Of the three carrier classes developed during the war, only the Taiho’s and Shinano’s represented any real opportunity. One, the Taiho, was not properly exploded mostly because Japan could not build them in numbers; the other, Shinano, although very promising, became irrelevant due to its late entry into the war. The Unryu class was Japan’s last attempt at matching the Americans in carriers. They were easy to mass produce because of its simplicity of design. This same trait also worked against them. By the time the class was ready for action their boats were easily outclassed by the new American flatbeds.
It was Japan’s lack of industrial material, know-how and experience work force that accounted for the small number (only five ships were developed) of new carriers during the war. In contrast, the United States developed and deployed 17 front line carriers during that same period.
Sources:
Warship International, Volume 1, International Naval Research Organization, Holden 1982
Aircraft Carriers, David Brown, Arco Publishing Company 1977
The Imperial Japanese Navy, BG Gordon & AJ Watts, MacDonald 1971
Japan entered hostilities against the western democracies with the most powerful and flexible carrier force that world had seen. Seven completed fleet carriers (Hosho, Akagi, Kaga, Ryujo, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku) formed the backbone of the Imperial Navy’s power projection force. They also possessed the most experienced naval aviators in the world. It was this numerical as well as tactical advantage the made possible Japan’s early surge into the Pacific Theater. At the end, Japan lost all of those carriers, with the exeption of the Hosho, in combat operations during the war. These losses were hard to overcome by a relative backward industrial society such as the one Japan possessed. During the war, Japan only managed to design and develop four additional fleet carriers, while its main adversary, the United States managed to build 17 front line fleet flatbeds. It was this fact that spelled the demise of the Japanese Navy in WWII.
It is the intention of this article to paint a clear picture of the development and conception of the Japanese flatbeds fleet during the war with the US. The article hopes to leave the reader with detail information on all the Japanese aircraft carriers developed and deployed between 1941 and 1945. It will make emphasis on the carriers’ developmental history as well as their combat operations, right to the end of their service lives.
A Brief History
The Japanese carrier development program before the Great War resembled those of the United States and the U.K. Their view of sea-based aircrafts flying aloft for hours was perceived to be for strategic as well as tactical reconnaissance operations only, thus no new advantage could be gained by constructing a vessel to operate airplanes only. Big guns still dominated their ideas, same as in the US and Britain. It was not until late in 1912, when Japanese official embedded, with Royal Navy forces, began to seriously consider the seaplane tender ship as an offensive platform instead of just another recon unit. With this in mind, in mid 1913, a major conceptual experimentation took place within the Imperial Japanese Navy confines. They were able to re-fit an old transport ship, the Wakamiya Maru, with two seaplanes extenders. In the fall of that year, the floatplanes operating out of the Wakamiya participated with the whole Combine Japanese Fleet in maneuvering and detecting exercises. The outcome of the exercises was impressive. The Wakamiya was able to located and engage most of the over-the-horizon targets assigned to its zone of operations without the “sea-plane carrier” being spotted by the Fleet’s screening ships. Trials continued trough the early months of 1914. Again, the seaplane tender demonstrated a unique ability to project power beyond its visual engagement range. In late 1914, faith intervened to push the nascent Japanese aircraft carrier program one step closer towards achieving operational status: the War to End All Wars erupted in Europe.
In an attempt to display their newly acquire naval power, Japanese leaders decided to extract territories from the overextended Imperial German forces in the Pacific, they wanted German-held territory in the south west coast region of China. The Wakamiya was dispatched as part of a Japanese fleet element assigned to capture ports and facilities in the Chinese coast. Meanwhile, Japanese observes and naval liaison officers attached to the British Royal Navy began reporting on the British employment of sea-tendered aircrafts to spot and track German ships, especially U-boats, operating in the North Sea as well as the Atlantic Ocean. These reports, as well the Japanese Navy’s own experience with the Wakamiya, enabled Japan to formulate a new strategic vision for its main fleet that incorporated the carrier as one of its main features, instead of just using it as a complementary platform. In the 1918, as well as in the 1920 budget, Japan allocated a major portion for their Navy design and development funds into their carrier platforms. This decision was augmented by an agreement with the UK, where the former would render technical assistance to the Japanese in exchange for some basing rights along the Hong Kong sea route. The British assistance centered on naval aircraft profiles and combat tactics. Faith again intervened when in 1922 the Washington Naval Treaty provided a structural limit on the size of the world’s top naval powers. The new treaty also provided the guidelines for displace characteristics of new ships designs. A limit of 27,000 tons was placed on all of the signatories. Any ship under construction above those limits was permitted but up to 33,000 tons. The tonnage aspect relating to carrier vessels was established at 81,000 for Japan, a deficiency of 54,000 tons from their US and British counterparts. It was this limitation that historians had attributed as one of the causes of Japan’s bellicose behavior towards the US since the early 1930s. It’s worth pointing out that during the Japanese binding to the Treaty’s tonnage limitation they were continually circumventing the tonnage issue in an effort to maintain parity in carriers with America.
There’s another, more important point to be made about how the Japanese Navy interpreted the Treaty’s ramifications on its carrier program. Before Washington 1922, Japan was a forerunner in the development of combat tactics for carrier platforms. They were one of the early converts to carrier power projection, but they still relegated the carrier force as a second fiddle to the big guns of the once mighty battleships. The Treaty, with its overall tonnage limitation, was the turning point in Japan’s carrier program. From that moment on, Japanese leaders decided not to augment its existing fleet of battleships, instead, the carriers would become the center piece of a newly designed Imperial Navy. Japanese leaders knew that they could not match ship per ship the US, but with a numerical as well as tactical advantage in deployable flatbeds, they believed that they could, not only offset the US numerical superiority in capital ships, but in fact take the strategic advantage away from the Americans in the vast Pacific Ocean. The new strategic position adopted by Japan in direct response to the new realities imposed on it by the 1922 accords meant that their main axis of attack would originate from its carriers force instead of the traditional battleship alignment, thus, from that moment on the carrier became Japan’s main first strike weapon system. As such distinction merits, all available naval resources were, either placed on the carrier itself or allocated to the development of the carrier’s air complement. Capital ships like battleships, heavy and light cruisers still received a substantial amount of the budget, but the importance of the Japanese had cleared shifted to their new first strike platform: the aircraft carrier.
Carrier Profiles
1. Taiho Class (Great Phoenix)
The Taiho had the distinction of being Japan’s first carrier to be fitted with a redundant damage control system that would had enable the flatbed to operate at the same profile even if she was damaged. Taiho was also the first carrier developed by Japan to incorporate an armored flight deck area. The deck’s thickness was in the range of 75 to 80mm. The Japanese believed that this level of reinforcement would have allowed the deck to withstand hits from up to 1,000lbs of free fall bombs. An armored belt of 5.9” circled the hull structure. But, as with most of Japan’s other carriers design, the Great Phoenix lacked armored platting hangars, a design flaw that would prove to be fatal for the entire carrier fleet. Taiho design was comparable to that of the famous Shokaku-class, except that it incorporated a large Island structure similar to that founded on the original Hiyu design. The other major departure from the Shokaku design was that the Great Phoenix’s bow was enclosed instead of the open air bow on pass vessels. This was done in order to provide the Taiho with an improve sea going capabilities. This new bow arrangement allowed the Taiho to have a more robust (33%) hangar space available for ordinance and fuel storage. The Great Phoenix was designed with a low center of gravity to improve the ship’s seaworthiness. As a result, the carrier had only to hangar elevators, one in the aft and the other in the forward area. With only two designated hangar areas available, the Taiho did packed an impressive cargo of aircrafts. Up to 75 front line plus 10 reserve aircraft could be embarked on the ship.
The new aircraft carrier was fitted with the newly designed Type 98 antiaircraft (AA) gun. This new gun was a 100mm demon that can shot at ranges up to 21,300 yards. Six dual mounts housed three of these awesome guns on each side of the hull. Seventeen of the triple 25mm guns were placed around the flight deck as well as in the Island superstructure. The Taiho also carried the two of the new Japanese Type 21 radar array. One was paced atop of the island while the other lay in the lower aft section of the structure. Taiho was completed in March 1944 and immediately was transferred to the Imperial Navy’s Mobile Fleet based at Singapore, where it was assigned to take over the flag of the Mobile Fleet.
Carrier Specifications
Total Displacement 29,300tons
Hull Length 855’-0”
Beam Area 91’-0”
Draft Section 32’-0”
Top Operational Speed 33 knots
Combat Range 10,200 nautical miles
Crew Complement 1,751
Taiho first extended combat action saw her launching strike aircrafts against a US carrier fleet in the morning of June 19th, 1944, when she was hit by one torpedo from the USS Albacore. Originally, the officers of the Taiho though that the hit was superficial and that the carrier would be able to sustained until it reached port, but in reality, the impact was more profound. The impact wave of the hit cracked the main aviation fuel tanks in the forward elevator area. As the fuel began to mix with sea water, the carrier’s crew demonstrated their under training in damage control tasks, a weakness that had already proven fatal to many of their companions in other flatbeds. They opened all hatches around the ship’s two hangar areas in an attempt to steam the water flow. It was to no avail. Because just four hours after the impact, the damage control crew turned on all of the hangar’s extractor fans thus setting up a massive explosion the blew the sides of the hangars. At this moment, the resulting fires began to consolidate and a second, most violent explosion shook up the ship. The hull was compromised and power was lost. Two hours later, the ship buckle under its own weight finally sinking with around 400 men trapped below the rupture deck.
2. Unryu Class (Unryu, Amagi and Katsuragi)
The Unryu class had the distinction of being Japan’s last front line carrier design of the war. The Unryu was a departure from the advance Taiho class. With this class, Japan returned to its original carrier designs roots. Speed above armor and protection was the rule instituted on the Unryu. The Unryu class was an attempt to match carriers with the US. In fact, the whole class was a crash curse on carrier construction. In 1941, the Navy ordered the development of six new flatbeds as soon as possible. The time requirement prevented Japanese shipyards to maximize what they had learned on the Taiho and Shokaku classes. To maximize their construction, all of six the carrier’s proposed on this class were designed along the lines of the Hiryu class. The first three hulls were laid in mid 1942, while the next three were to be under construction by the autumn of 1943. Those three never made it out of the yard. When the program was terminated in the spring of 1945, these three units (Ikoma, Katsuragi and Kasagi) were nearly a three quarters up. There were initial speculation that if the class was able to perform adequately, eleven additional units would have been ordered.
The Unryu class boats possessed almost the same hull structure, armor plating and hangar space distribution of the Hiryu. Their only structural difference was the Island placement. In the new class, the Island was located forward on the starboard side of the ship. As with others Japanese carrier designs, only two elevators were fitted to the boats. Two main hangar areas were able to storage 57 operational planes with seven reserved units as backup. The carriers of this class were armed with the same Type 89 guns as in the Hiryu boat. Three of the 89s were placed on each side of the carrier’s upper hull area. Sixteen triple and three single fire 25mm antiaircraft guns were also fitted around the flatbed’s superstructure. An additional four triple and thirteen single 25s were installed, giving the Unryu class an impressive array of 76 AA guns. The class was also the first of its kind in Japan to carry six 28 barrel 4.7” rocket launchers for short range action. Another distinction for the carriers was that they were the first platforms to be incorporated with a radar system since its design. Two of the Type 13 radars arrays were installed. One at the island’s mainmast and the other on the four hinged radio antenna.
Carrier Specifications
Total Displacement: 17,150 tons Unryu
17,260 tons Katsuragi
17,460 tons Amagi
Hull Length 742’-0”
Beam Area 72’-0”
Draft Section 26’-0”
Top Operational Speed 34 knots (Katsuragi 33 knots)
Combat Range 8,000 nautical miles
Crew Complement 1,595
Of the three completed ships of the class, only one actually saw active combat. And that action only involved the ferrying of aircrafts and ammunition to the Japanese garrison in the Philippines during the last stages of the war. Unryu, the lead boat, was commissioned in August 1944 and immediately was assigned to the Mobile Fleet. In December she was tasked to carry airplanes into Manila Harbor. On the 9th, while in transit to the Philippines, the Unryu was spotted by the submarine USS Redfish. The Redfish proceeded to put two torpedoes into the port side of the carrier hitting the half-filed aviation fuel tanks. The ensuing explosion sent the boat to the bottom with nearly 1,350 of its crew compliment. The other two carriers, the Amagi and Katsuragi were commissioned in October 1944. Neither embarked on any ocean going travel, mostly because of Japan’s massive fuel shortages. In March 1945, the Amagi was lightly damage in an American raid on Kure. On July 25th, a more intense bombardment damaged the Amagi’s hull integrity and she sank within minutes. Amagi had the distinction of being the last Japanese carrier sunk in combat. Katsuragi, who also received heavy damage during the 24th raid, survived the war. She was issue to the Allies as reparation payment and was ultimately scrapped in the fall of 1946.
3. Shimano Class
The largest carrier built during World War II, Shinano would remain the biggest flatbed in the world until the US Navy deployed its first series of super carriers in the 1950s. Shinano was original conceived as the last of the Yamato class super battleships. Laid in May 1940, work of the battleship stopped by June 1942. In August the Japanese Navy decided that the era of the big gun wagons was over and, still coping with the losses suffered at Midway, decided to convert the Shinano to an aircraft carrier. Work on the conversion started in September. At the time, Japanese naval leaders envisioned a new role for the huge hulled ship: floating fortress. The Shinano would become the next step in the evolution of the aircraft carrier, Japanese commanders thought at the time. Aircrafts from small decked carriers as well as long range land based planes would use the Shinano as sort of refueling and re-supplying platform. Thus in the design of the ship’s structure, only one hangar deck area was implemented. This reduced the amount of planes, 47, that new flatbed could carry. These planes were primarily for self defense purposes.
The Shinano’s design closely resembled that of the Taiho’s. The ship’s was fitted with an armored flight deck of three inches. Two elevators served the hangar area which was divided into two separate compartments. The forward hangar area was only covered by shutters, while the rear area was completely enclosed. A huge island structure, with a slanted stack, was placed the same way as in the Taiho’s. A massive armored belt, over eight inches in thickness, covered the other hull area. Additional armored platting, 7.5 inches worth, was installed on the machinery and magazine’s areas. Two pairs of Type 89 AA were placed on the forward and rear areas of each hull side. Between 30 and 33 triple 25mm guns were mounted all around the deck area. Twelve short range rocket launchers were also added. Two Type 21 radar systems were placed on the ship. One in forward area of the island and the other in the aft. These were augmented by two additional Type 13 arrays. One installed on the mainmast and the other on the forward port side of the radio antenna.
Carrier Profile Characteristics
Total Displacement: 62,000tons
Hull Length 873’-0”
Beam Area 119’-0”
Draft Section 34’-0”
Top Operational Speed 27 knots
Combat Range 10,000 nautical miles
Crew Complement 2,400
Apart of being the largest carrier built at the time, Shinano had also the distinction of having the shortest life span of any carrier in WW II. Commissioned in the morning of November 18th, 1944, Shinano departed the Yokosuka docks on the 28th for final fittings at Kure. On the early hours of the 29th, she was torpedo by the USS Archerfish. Although the damage was not considered sever, the ship did not had its full complement of counter flooding and damage control systems. As the ship continued its voyage, the flooding, checked by the crew at first, began to overmatch the ship’s countermeasures. Power was lost and after eleven hours, the mighty ship capsized tanking with her 1,350 crewmembers.
In the end, Japan felt victim of what the saw before the war commenced as its biggest weakness: their small industrial base. Of the three carrier classes developed during the war, only the Taiho’s and Shinano’s represented any real opportunity. One, the Taiho, was not properly exploded mostly because Japan could not build them in numbers; the other, Shinano, although very promising, became irrelevant due to its late entry into the war. The Unryu class was Japan’s last attempt at matching the Americans in carriers. They were easy to mass produce because of its simplicity of design. This same trait also worked against them. By the time the class was ready for action their boats were easily outclassed by the new American flatbeds.
It was Japan’s lack of industrial material, know-how and experience work force that accounted for the small number (only five ships were developed) of new carriers during the war. In contrast, the United States developed and deployed 17 front line carriers during that same period.
Sources:
Warship International, Volume 1, International Naval Research Organization, Holden 1982
Aircraft Carriers, David Brown, Arco Publishing Company 1977
The Imperial Japanese Navy, BG Gordon & AJ Watts, MacDonald 1971
Friday, December 31, 2010
Weather and human error, most likely causes of crash chopper in Puerto Rico
Details of the night when a National Guard chopper went down paint a picture of human error, exacerbated by bad weather.
The error was probably caused by a series of bad weather patterns that showed up in the flight profile of the aircraft.
On Dec. 20, a National Guard chopper carrying six people went down in the waters just north of the coast of Río Grande during a mission sponsored by the Justice Department.
Five bodies have been recovered so far. The other is still missing and presumed dead.
In the early evening, at least two radar systems in the island painted the area between Loiza and Ceiba in red, meaning that there was a high degree of bad weather, including thunderstorms with lighting associated with them.
According to Weather Underground, an online radar system, the area was seriously contaminated with several bad weather patterns.
The flight pattern of one mile off the coastline and the operational ceiling at the time, 400 feet, suggested that the pilots of the downed UH-72 Lakota were trying to avoid rough weather.
Several experts, who preferred to remain anonymous, have told the Daily Sun that the debris recovered from the fuselage points to a violent collision at sea.
There are two ways to down a troubled chopper if the pilot has some control of the aircraft, even without power.
One is a controlled crash landing and the other is forced landing.
There are two recent examples of these types of landing.
In the last decade, the local police department has landed two choppers, in the sea, with partial control. One of those instances occurred while chasing a high speed boat believed to be carrying illegal drugs.
The parts of the fuselage recovered from the latest crash suggest that the landing was not a controlled one.
The destruction seen and the matter in which the bodies were found points to a collision speed of 100 to 120 knots, or 100 mile per hour.
At a 400 foot ceiling, meaning that the aircraft crashed violently, argues one expert, destroying the insides of the cockpit, which explain the absence of security harnesses on each of the five bodies found.
According to Defense policy, the search and recovery effort will be conducted by Army aviation regulations.
A team of three aviation accident specialists from Fort Rucker, Ala., with the assistance of two officials from the Coast Guard Board, based on Virginia and a member of the Puerto Rico National Guard, a physician, are conducting the investigation.
In an effort to recover the remains of the missing airman and the rest of the fuselage, including the cabin, Defense contracted the services of Titan Maritime LLC, a world renowned salvage company that has provided services for the Pentagon for decades.
The debris recovered is in storage at the Muñiz Air Base in Carolina.
There are rumors that the crash was caused by several of the Lakota’s instruments -- including the multi functional display and vehicle engine monitor display -- which could have shorted out due to malfunction provoked by high temperatures in the cabin.
That theory has been partially dismissed by investigating officers.
The Daily Sun has learned that the main theory which could have led to a crash landing was the weather and a possible disorientation on the part of the crew.
Investigators are also mulling whether there was a struggle between the pilot and co-pilot in a frantic effort to gain control of the chopper.
The absence of radio communication and even a cell phone call, also points to the fact that the aircraft suffered from a catastrophic and sudden crash, which suggests a forced landing due to crew disorientation.
The mission started a month before the actual flight occurred when Justice Secretary Guillermo Somoza met with National Guard Adjutant General Antonio J. Vicéns, to discuss details of a multi-pronged operation involving at least two targets.
Several sources told the Daily Sun that besides Vieques, at least one luxury marina in the eastern section of the island was a target.
It all started on Dec. 20 at the Aviation Assistance Area of the Army National Guard at the Isla Grande Airport.
Around 5:50 p.m., Guard officials submitted the flight plan for the Lakota, as well as four other choppers, including three Black Hawks and one Kiowa reconnaissance helicopter.
The Lakota is part of the United States Army Light Utility Helicopter fleet. In 2006, Defense selected the rotary-winged aircraft as a replacement for its aging fleet of Vietnam-era Kiowa choppers.
At 6:40 p.m., the Lakota took off from the base en route to Vieques, on a trip intended to take from 15 to 25 minutes.
According to Vicéns, the Lakota was assigned the task of an aerial command center for the overall mission, including Vieques and possibly the Puerto Del Rey Marina in Ceiba, where it was scheduled to touch down after completing its mission.
The Lakota was the second aircraft dispatched from Isla Grande that night.
First to depart was a Blackhawk, followed by the rest of the force several minutes later.
The magnitude of the operation could be measured by the allocation of National Guard resources. In a 35-minute period, the force dispatched almost half of its available helicopters.
As it took off, the Lakota maintained radio and radar contact with the other members of the fleet as well as with the San Juan Radar Station at the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport.
In fact, the pilot of one of the Blackhawks, José García, confirmed that twice during the flight, the Lakota maintained contact with the other members of the fleet through the radar station.
“We had communication with [the Lakota] twice before 7 p.m., and in none of those communications did the pilot express any problem with the aircraft," García said. "Nor did he report anything unusual about the weather.”
Around 7 p.m., García reported that he had noticed the absence of the Lakota and started to search from Loíza to Río Grande, ultimately landing his Blackhawk in the coastal area outside the Hotel Meliá in Río Grande. It was approximately 7:40 p.m., he said.
Another Blackhawk came to his aid to look for the missing Lakota. The initial search lasted about two hours.
García said he was near the Sandy Hills condominiums when he decided to turn back and start looking for the missing aircraft.
“At no time during my return did I encounter a bad weather pattern. In fact, I flew by visual flight rules, not instrumentation,” said the experienced aviator.
He recalled there were several rainy areas to the east of his positions. According to his recollection, the bad weather area was a mile off the coast of Río Grande, where the Lakota apparently crash landed.
Garcia argued that during the Lakota’s two communications with the SJRS, the pilots never mentioned bad weather.
His assumption was that the Lakota had to have gone through the bad weather area without any trouble.
After several passes through the area, Garcia’s chopper landed back in Ceiba and at 8:02, the Coast Guard took control of the search.
For four hours, the Coast Guard and several other National Guard helicopters searched the area until the initial debris began to appear at midnight.
The UH-72 Lakota is the backbone of the U.S. National Guard. The downed aircraft was brought to the island in May and had its last inspection on Dec. 14, six days before the fatal crash.
By Raul Colon for the Puerto Rico Daily Sun
The error was probably caused by a series of bad weather patterns that showed up in the flight profile of the aircraft.
On Dec. 20, a National Guard chopper carrying six people went down in the waters just north of the coast of Río Grande during a mission sponsored by the Justice Department.
Five bodies have been recovered so far. The other is still missing and presumed dead.
In the early evening, at least two radar systems in the island painted the area between Loiza and Ceiba in red, meaning that there was a high degree of bad weather, including thunderstorms with lighting associated with them.
According to Weather Underground, an online radar system, the area was seriously contaminated with several bad weather patterns.
The flight pattern of one mile off the coastline and the operational ceiling at the time, 400 feet, suggested that the pilots of the downed UH-72 Lakota were trying to avoid rough weather.
Several experts, who preferred to remain anonymous, have told the Daily Sun that the debris recovered from the fuselage points to a violent collision at sea.
There are two ways to down a troubled chopper if the pilot has some control of the aircraft, even without power.
One is a controlled crash landing and the other is forced landing.
There are two recent examples of these types of landing.
In the last decade, the local police department has landed two choppers, in the sea, with partial control. One of those instances occurred while chasing a high speed boat believed to be carrying illegal drugs.
The parts of the fuselage recovered from the latest crash suggest that the landing was not a controlled one.
The destruction seen and the matter in which the bodies were found points to a collision speed of 100 to 120 knots, or 100 mile per hour.
At a 400 foot ceiling, meaning that the aircraft crashed violently, argues one expert, destroying the insides of the cockpit, which explain the absence of security harnesses on each of the five bodies found.
According to Defense policy, the search and recovery effort will be conducted by Army aviation regulations.
A team of three aviation accident specialists from Fort Rucker, Ala., with the assistance of two officials from the Coast Guard Board, based on Virginia and a member of the Puerto Rico National Guard, a physician, are conducting the investigation.
In an effort to recover the remains of the missing airman and the rest of the fuselage, including the cabin, Defense contracted the services of Titan Maritime LLC, a world renowned salvage company that has provided services for the Pentagon for decades.
The debris recovered is in storage at the Muñiz Air Base in Carolina.
There are rumors that the crash was caused by several of the Lakota’s instruments -- including the multi functional display and vehicle engine monitor display -- which could have shorted out due to malfunction provoked by high temperatures in the cabin.
That theory has been partially dismissed by investigating officers.
The Daily Sun has learned that the main theory which could have led to a crash landing was the weather and a possible disorientation on the part of the crew.
Investigators are also mulling whether there was a struggle between the pilot and co-pilot in a frantic effort to gain control of the chopper.
The absence of radio communication and even a cell phone call, also points to the fact that the aircraft suffered from a catastrophic and sudden crash, which suggests a forced landing due to crew disorientation.
The mission started a month before the actual flight occurred when Justice Secretary Guillermo Somoza met with National Guard Adjutant General Antonio J. Vicéns, to discuss details of a multi-pronged operation involving at least two targets.
Several sources told the Daily Sun that besides Vieques, at least one luxury marina in the eastern section of the island was a target.
It all started on Dec. 20 at the Aviation Assistance Area of the Army National Guard at the Isla Grande Airport.
Around 5:50 p.m., Guard officials submitted the flight plan for the Lakota, as well as four other choppers, including three Black Hawks and one Kiowa reconnaissance helicopter.
The Lakota is part of the United States Army Light Utility Helicopter fleet. In 2006, Defense selected the rotary-winged aircraft as a replacement for its aging fleet of Vietnam-era Kiowa choppers.
At 6:40 p.m., the Lakota took off from the base en route to Vieques, on a trip intended to take from 15 to 25 minutes.
According to Vicéns, the Lakota was assigned the task of an aerial command center for the overall mission, including Vieques and possibly the Puerto Del Rey Marina in Ceiba, where it was scheduled to touch down after completing its mission.
The Lakota was the second aircraft dispatched from Isla Grande that night.
First to depart was a Blackhawk, followed by the rest of the force several minutes later.
The magnitude of the operation could be measured by the allocation of National Guard resources. In a 35-minute period, the force dispatched almost half of its available helicopters.
As it took off, the Lakota maintained radio and radar contact with the other members of the fleet as well as with the San Juan Radar Station at the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport.
In fact, the pilot of one of the Blackhawks, José García, confirmed that twice during the flight, the Lakota maintained contact with the other members of the fleet through the radar station.
“We had communication with [the Lakota] twice before 7 p.m., and in none of those communications did the pilot express any problem with the aircraft," García said. "Nor did he report anything unusual about the weather.”
Around 7 p.m., García reported that he had noticed the absence of the Lakota and started to search from Loíza to Río Grande, ultimately landing his Blackhawk in the coastal area outside the Hotel Meliá in Río Grande. It was approximately 7:40 p.m., he said.
Another Blackhawk came to his aid to look for the missing Lakota. The initial search lasted about two hours.
García said he was near the Sandy Hills condominiums when he decided to turn back and start looking for the missing aircraft.
“At no time during my return did I encounter a bad weather pattern. In fact, I flew by visual flight rules, not instrumentation,” said the experienced aviator.
He recalled there were several rainy areas to the east of his positions. According to his recollection, the bad weather area was a mile off the coast of Río Grande, where the Lakota apparently crash landed.
Garcia argued that during the Lakota’s two communications with the SJRS, the pilots never mentioned bad weather.
His assumption was that the Lakota had to have gone through the bad weather area without any trouble.
After several passes through the area, Garcia’s chopper landed back in Ceiba and at 8:02, the Coast Guard took control of the search.
For four hours, the Coast Guard and several other National Guard helicopters searched the area until the initial debris began to appear at midnight.
The UH-72 Lakota is the backbone of the U.S. National Guard. The downed aircraft was brought to the island in May and had its last inspection on Dec. 14, six days before the fatal crash.
By Raul Colon for the Puerto Rico Daily Sun
Thursday, December 30, 2010
Puerto Rico without medical airlift?
In February, the island could be left without a medical emergency airlift because the government does not pay the only company that provides this vital service.
Several physicians operating at the Río Piedras Medical Center interviewed by the Daily Sun, told horror stories of patients arriving at the trauma center near death because of road transportation, which takes longer than an airlift.
“There were a lot of cases when the individual could be saved, but because they were not transported through air, they die en route. Air transportation is imperative in some high trauma cases,” said a doctor who wished to remain anonymous.
The main reason family or doctors choose land transportation is to save money, according to consensus.
Several other doctors confirmed the statement of the need for a reliable airlift capability.
Accurate data on the number of deaths attributed to a lack of an emergency airlift capability were not available, but most experts and industry insiders placed the number at more than a dozen every year.
The island has already been without a medical airlift service since Aero-Med filed for Chapter 11 bankrupcy in 2008, ceasing all operations that year until Dec. 2009.
Then, in March 2010, after providing the government with service for nearly two months without receiving compensation, the company shut down again until the Centro American and Caribbean Games started in July.
Mounting government debts are financially strangling Aero-Med, Puerto Rico’s sole helicopter medical airlift company, to the point that many board members are questioning the wisdom of continuing to operate.
Over all, the government owes the company in excess of $600,000 in current and back payments.
For a corporation with an operational overhead of $200,000 a month, that’s a critical debt to be carrying and one that can’t continue for much longer.
Aero-Med President José Hernández argued that without a real resolution of the payment situation, his company will be hard pressed to continue operating past early 2011.
“We gave the government service in January and February waiting to see what their attitude would be regarding payment,” Hernández said.
The government failed to pay, forcing the company to close the much needed operation once gain.
When the Mayaguez 2010 games were set to start, the government was forced to pay Aero-Med to provide services.
The Daily Sun has learned that many persons inside Gov. Fortuño’s administration were not too keen to have the service back in operations, mainly due to the outstanding balance it had accumulated with the company.
An administration official suggested the idea that the Coast Guard and National Guard could supply the choppers for the airlift, if needed.
“We resumed operations on July 17 after we told the government we would not operate during the Games because of the outstanding debt.
Four days prior to the Games they decided to contract us,” Hernández said.
The list of debtors starts with its biggest client, the Automobile Accident Compensation Administration (AACA), which owes the corporation more than $300,000 and accounts for 48 percent of its transported patients.
Since the Mayagüez event, the AACA has reduced the overall size of its debt from $500,000 to the current level but the agency and the other government institutions that use the services have not signed their service contracts as discussed after the incident.
Nearly all the injured covered by AACA are car accident victims who must be transported.
The Health Department had an outstanding balance of $100,000 and the Corporation for the State Insurance Fund owes $45,000.
The Health transfers are usually crime victims, trauma patients, and even babies, such as one 11-day old infant the company moved from a mountain town to the Río Piedras Medical Center on Christmas Day.
To add to the problem, the service contracts between two of those agencies, AACA and the Department, are set to expire soon.
The agreement with the CSIF expired two years ago, and still the coporation keeps flying injured workers, including a Puerto Rico Electrical Power Authority line worker who suffered an accident on the job.
The contract with the CSIF is important to the government, because they are the agency that compensates for work-related accidents involving primary workers like police officers, fire fighters and even emergency personnel.
But the CSIF has been negligent in their management of the situation.
Despite not having a signed contract with Aero-Med, officials from the Fund routinely call up the company for an airlift.
“There’s a person there (CSIF), Dr. García, who calls us every time he needs an airlift, and promises us payments and contract signings, but after the service is provided, he disappears,” Hernández said.
Conversations regarding the service agreement with the Health Department is set to start next week. The deal with AACA is still in the early stages.
Aero-Med is also facing another situation, the refusal to pay for transporting injured individuals who do not fulfill certain criteria.
AACA does not cover the transportation of people who have been in accidents involving four-track trucks, victims under the influence of alcohol and illegal drugs, victims without a valid driving license and individuals who are not yet identified when the lift is ordered.
Early in the year, Health Secretary Lorenzo González told Hernández that he would be requesting a monthly allocation from the Legislature to cover the expenses regularly.
The problem is that as of today, no allocation or other disbursement has been approved or is under discussion at the Capitol.
Overall, Aero-Med made between 35 to 45 trips a month this past year, a figure that pales in comparision to the almost 90 monthly flights it performed a decade ago.
By Raul Colon for the PR Daily Sun
Several physicians operating at the Río Piedras Medical Center interviewed by the Daily Sun, told horror stories of patients arriving at the trauma center near death because of road transportation, which takes longer than an airlift.
“There were a lot of cases when the individual could be saved, but because they were not transported through air, they die en route. Air transportation is imperative in some high trauma cases,” said a doctor who wished to remain anonymous.
The main reason family or doctors choose land transportation is to save money, according to consensus.
Several other doctors confirmed the statement of the need for a reliable airlift capability.
Accurate data on the number of deaths attributed to a lack of an emergency airlift capability were not available, but most experts and industry insiders placed the number at more than a dozen every year.
The island has already been without a medical airlift service since Aero-Med filed for Chapter 11 bankrupcy in 2008, ceasing all operations that year until Dec. 2009.
Then, in March 2010, after providing the government with service for nearly two months without receiving compensation, the company shut down again until the Centro American and Caribbean Games started in July.
Mounting government debts are financially strangling Aero-Med, Puerto Rico’s sole helicopter medical airlift company, to the point that many board members are questioning the wisdom of continuing to operate.
Over all, the government owes the company in excess of $600,000 in current and back payments.
For a corporation with an operational overhead of $200,000 a month, that’s a critical debt to be carrying and one that can’t continue for much longer.
Aero-Med President José Hernández argued that without a real resolution of the payment situation, his company will be hard pressed to continue operating past early 2011.
“We gave the government service in January and February waiting to see what their attitude would be regarding payment,” Hernández said.
The government failed to pay, forcing the company to close the much needed operation once gain.
When the Mayaguez 2010 games were set to start, the government was forced to pay Aero-Med to provide services.
The Daily Sun has learned that many persons inside Gov. Fortuño’s administration were not too keen to have the service back in operations, mainly due to the outstanding balance it had accumulated with the company.
An administration official suggested the idea that the Coast Guard and National Guard could supply the choppers for the airlift, if needed.
“We resumed operations on July 17 after we told the government we would not operate during the Games because of the outstanding debt.
Four days prior to the Games they decided to contract us,” Hernández said.
The list of debtors starts with its biggest client, the Automobile Accident Compensation Administration (AACA), which owes the corporation more than $300,000 and accounts for 48 percent of its transported patients.
Since the Mayagüez event, the AACA has reduced the overall size of its debt from $500,000 to the current level but the agency and the other government institutions that use the services have not signed their service contracts as discussed after the incident.
Nearly all the injured covered by AACA are car accident victims who must be transported.
The Health Department had an outstanding balance of $100,000 and the Corporation for the State Insurance Fund owes $45,000.
The Health transfers are usually crime victims, trauma patients, and even babies, such as one 11-day old infant the company moved from a mountain town to the Río Piedras Medical Center on Christmas Day.
To add to the problem, the service contracts between two of those agencies, AACA and the Department, are set to expire soon.
The agreement with the CSIF expired two years ago, and still the coporation keeps flying injured workers, including a Puerto Rico Electrical Power Authority line worker who suffered an accident on the job.
The contract with the CSIF is important to the government, because they are the agency that compensates for work-related accidents involving primary workers like police officers, fire fighters and even emergency personnel.
But the CSIF has been negligent in their management of the situation.
Despite not having a signed contract with Aero-Med, officials from the Fund routinely call up the company for an airlift.
“There’s a person there (CSIF), Dr. García, who calls us every time he needs an airlift, and promises us payments and contract signings, but after the service is provided, he disappears,” Hernández said.
Conversations regarding the service agreement with the Health Department is set to start next week. The deal with AACA is still in the early stages.
Aero-Med is also facing another situation, the refusal to pay for transporting injured individuals who do not fulfill certain criteria.
AACA does not cover the transportation of people who have been in accidents involving four-track trucks, victims under the influence of alcohol and illegal drugs, victims without a valid driving license and individuals who are not yet identified when the lift is ordered.
Early in the year, Health Secretary Lorenzo González told Hernández that he would be requesting a monthly allocation from the Legislature to cover the expenses regularly.
The problem is that as of today, no allocation or other disbursement has been approved or is under discussion at the Capitol.
Overall, Aero-Med made between 35 to 45 trips a month this past year, a figure that pales in comparision to the almost 90 monthly flights it performed a decade ago.
By Raul Colon for the PR Daily Sun
Monday, December 27, 2010
Puerto Rico, crime capital of the United States
Statistics usually paint a complete picture and this is the case of the massive crime wave ripping the island this year.
The most important of them all, murders, are up 8 percent compared to 2009.
Police data shows that as of Dec. 25, there have been 962 reported violence deaths, 72 more than in 2009 and on pace to creep to the thousand plateau.
By comparison, in 2009, there were 13,600 murders in the entire United States, including its territories.
That’s mean that Puerto Rico accounts for almost 8 percent of all violence deaths in the U.S. despite having less than a fraction of one percent of its population.
Of the 13 police regions, 8 have reported an increase in deadly crime compared to the previous year.
Four of them, Arecibo, Bayamón, Caguas and Mayaguez have seen a double digit increase.
Caguas has the dubious distinction of having the largest increase in number of murders, going from 62 in 2009 to 81 so far this year.
Percentage-wise, Mayaguez has experimented the highest hike, a 46 percent increase (24 in 2009 to 35 this year).
Even Aibonito has seen an increase in killings (20 percent) from the previous year.
Once again, the most fertile ground for killing on the island is the metropolitan area.
San Juan reports 196 killings as of Dec. 25th, a 5 percent increase over 2009. Bayamón follows the deadly trail with 169 reported murders, 13 more than the previous year.
Ponce breaks the metropolitan monopoly when it comes to crime, as they have seen 119 killings in 2010.
Carolina rounds out the list of regions with 116.
But not only murders are on the rise, robberies have increased 10 percent from 2009.
The police have reported 6,764 robberies this year, 604 more than in 2009.
In this area, Bayamón is the undisputed leader with 1,845 robbery attempts, a 28 percent hike from 2009.
San Juan follows with 1,768, a 17 percent increase.
The only bright spot in the damaging statistics is the palpable decrease in rape cases reported.
Figures provided by the police show a dramatic 33 percent reduction in that area of crime, going from 55 in 2009 to 37 so far. e acts aside from murders.
Data showed a solid, 21 percent decrease in the number of assault cases filed (2,644 compared to 3,364 in 2009).
Another statistic that points downward is crime against property, with an overall decrease of 7 percent (57,803 in 2009 compared to 53,563 this year).
Those types of crimes involve car theft, which is barely down a fraction of 1 percent (only 13 less than in 2009) and illegal appropriation, down 12 percent.
Still, the high number of killings seems to disguise any improvement in crime prevention.
The almost 1,000 murders for the year are the clearest indication that the Fortuno administration had failed in crime prevention.
It also means that police superintendent Jose Figueroa Sancha is incapable of handling the island’s biggest problem and as such, he needs to resign immediately.
That’s the opinion of Popular Democratic Party (PDP) lawmaker Eder Ortiz who once again called for, not only the dismissal of Figueroa, but for a complete overhaul of the crime fighting strategy.
“The strategy of fighting crime is a shame. First of all, it is obvious to anyone that it is not working. The government needs to provide mire than a media show every time they enter a residential complex,” Ortiz said.
Golpe al Punto (Blow to the Drug Point) is one of the most criticized crime prevention program for Ortiz to its lack of depth as it is only targeted to one sector, according to Ortiz.
“That program has been an utter failure. Crimes keep happening on those areas and with a relentless pace. The police should change strategies and instead of focusing on drug addicts, should start looking for the killers,” Ortiz said.
For the PDP Senator, the Superintendent and the Justice Department needs to shift their focus from what he called “rounding out drug addicts” to a full target of those individuals who have actually pulled the trigger in murders.
“We need to focus of getting those who actually kill people. Here, the Police and Justice Department have been concentrated on napping the addicts and the people who finance the drug trafficking, but the real problem is the murders,” he said.
To combat the alarming murder rate on the island, Ortiz suggested a new focus.
First, he believed in the integration of a medial program to treat drug addicts in order to ease the weight on crime fighting in that area, moving it to the health system.
The idea seems to have broad base support as New Progressive Party Sen. Carmelo Rios and presume PDP gubernatorial candidate, Sen. Alejandro Garcia Padilla, have backed the idea.
Second, the police must concentrate the majority of their resources in solving killings.
“I would assign 2 or 3 investigative agents to each murder case until it is solved. That way, the cases should be handled with more depth and better results would be expected.”
Ortiz also proposed that instead of entering the public residential complexes with police units, the government should sent detachments of specialist from other agencies in order to pave the way in the recovery of the sector targeted.
The PDP legislator argues for an intervention by the Family, Health, Education and Sport and Recreation Departments every time a Golpe al Punto operative is mounted.
“The different agencies should move inside the complex to provide social help to those individuals and families in order to offer them an alternative,” Ortiz said.
By Raul Colon for Puerto Rico Daily Sun
The most important of them all, murders, are up 8 percent compared to 2009.
Police data shows that as of Dec. 25, there have been 962 reported violence deaths, 72 more than in 2009 and on pace to creep to the thousand plateau.
By comparison, in 2009, there were 13,600 murders in the entire United States, including its territories.
That’s mean that Puerto Rico accounts for almost 8 percent of all violence deaths in the U.S. despite having less than a fraction of one percent of its population.
Of the 13 police regions, 8 have reported an increase in deadly crime compared to the previous year.
Four of them, Arecibo, Bayamón, Caguas and Mayaguez have seen a double digit increase.
Caguas has the dubious distinction of having the largest increase in number of murders, going from 62 in 2009 to 81 so far this year.
Percentage-wise, Mayaguez has experimented the highest hike, a 46 percent increase (24 in 2009 to 35 this year).
Even Aibonito has seen an increase in killings (20 percent) from the previous year.
Once again, the most fertile ground for killing on the island is the metropolitan area.
San Juan reports 196 killings as of Dec. 25th, a 5 percent increase over 2009. Bayamón follows the deadly trail with 169 reported murders, 13 more than the previous year.
Ponce breaks the metropolitan monopoly when it comes to crime, as they have seen 119 killings in 2010.
Carolina rounds out the list of regions with 116.
But not only murders are on the rise, robberies have increased 10 percent from 2009.
The police have reported 6,764 robberies this year, 604 more than in 2009.
In this area, Bayamón is the undisputed leader with 1,845 robbery attempts, a 28 percent hike from 2009.
San Juan follows with 1,768, a 17 percent increase.
The only bright spot in the damaging statistics is the palpable decrease in rape cases reported.
Figures provided by the police show a dramatic 33 percent reduction in that area of crime, going from 55 in 2009 to 37 so far. e acts aside from murders.
Data showed a solid, 21 percent decrease in the number of assault cases filed (2,644 compared to 3,364 in 2009).
Another statistic that points downward is crime against property, with an overall decrease of 7 percent (57,803 in 2009 compared to 53,563 this year).
Those types of crimes involve car theft, which is barely down a fraction of 1 percent (only 13 less than in 2009) and illegal appropriation, down 12 percent.
Still, the high number of killings seems to disguise any improvement in crime prevention.
The almost 1,000 murders for the year are the clearest indication that the Fortuno administration had failed in crime prevention.
It also means that police superintendent Jose Figueroa Sancha is incapable of handling the island’s biggest problem and as such, he needs to resign immediately.
That’s the opinion of Popular Democratic Party (PDP) lawmaker Eder Ortiz who once again called for, not only the dismissal of Figueroa, but for a complete overhaul of the crime fighting strategy.
“The strategy of fighting crime is a shame. First of all, it is obvious to anyone that it is not working. The government needs to provide mire than a media show every time they enter a residential complex,” Ortiz said.
Golpe al Punto (Blow to the Drug Point) is one of the most criticized crime prevention program for Ortiz to its lack of depth as it is only targeted to one sector, according to Ortiz.
“That program has been an utter failure. Crimes keep happening on those areas and with a relentless pace. The police should change strategies and instead of focusing on drug addicts, should start looking for the killers,” Ortiz said.
For the PDP Senator, the Superintendent and the Justice Department needs to shift their focus from what he called “rounding out drug addicts” to a full target of those individuals who have actually pulled the trigger in murders.
“We need to focus of getting those who actually kill people. Here, the Police and Justice Department have been concentrated on napping the addicts and the people who finance the drug trafficking, but the real problem is the murders,” he said.
To combat the alarming murder rate on the island, Ortiz suggested a new focus.
First, he believed in the integration of a medial program to treat drug addicts in order to ease the weight on crime fighting in that area, moving it to the health system.
The idea seems to have broad base support as New Progressive Party Sen. Carmelo Rios and presume PDP gubernatorial candidate, Sen. Alejandro Garcia Padilla, have backed the idea.
Second, the police must concentrate the majority of their resources in solving killings.
“I would assign 2 or 3 investigative agents to each murder case until it is solved. That way, the cases should be handled with more depth and better results would be expected.”
Ortiz also proposed that instead of entering the public residential complexes with police units, the government should sent detachments of specialist from other agencies in order to pave the way in the recovery of the sector targeted.
The PDP legislator argues for an intervention by the Family, Health, Education and Sport and Recreation Departments every time a Golpe al Punto operative is mounted.
“The different agencies should move inside the complex to provide social help to those individuals and families in order to offer them an alternative,” Ortiz said.
By Raul Colon for Puerto Rico Daily Sun
Friday, December 24, 2010
Local party to re-organize
The Popular Democratic Party will have a new organizational structure behind its presumed nominee for governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla.
In announcing the changes, Rep. Jaime Perelló, Chairman of the PDP Special Rules Committee, gave his first profound endorsement of García Padilla as his party’s next gubernatorial candidate.
Among the changes in the new platform are the creation of 12 new regional directorates and the introduction of a women-only vice-presidency.
Other institutions created by Perelló’s proposal are the Auxiliary Theme Secretaries which would concentrate the resources of health, security issues, economic and education in separate organizations.
The Committee also called for the introduction of an Auxiliary Professional Youth Secretary as well as the development of 16 sectoral organizations to include experts in the fields of the environment, agriculture, labor issues, sports, and handicapped persons.
“We started this work more than a year ago with visits to the base of the party. In fact, this new proposal placed the organization structure of the party closer to the base, which included the special communities, among other sectors,” Perello said.
According to the freshman lawmaker, the new organizational model would fundamentally alter the structure of the island’s oldest political institution.
The proposal now has to be approved by the PDP Governmental Board, which seems like a "slam dunk."
After their approval, the platform would need to be ratified by the Program and Rules Assembly.
Once approved, the party would begin its re-organization effort at a General Assembly, which should be convoked no later than May.
“It’s my understanding that by April or March, the majority of the organization of the party should be completed and that includes the selection of the party’s president,” Perelló said.
The PDP lawmaker made no secret who should occupy that post in light of the 2012 elections.
“I believed that Alejandro García Padilla, who has my support, is the person who would be sitting in that position. He has done the work with the base and has been involved in the reorganization effort since the start,” Perelló said.
In an effort to provide continuity in case of a transition, the PDP would make the post of secretary general a permanent one with a term limit of four years.
The party president will nominate the person, who will then have to be confirmed by the governing board.
The Committee’s proposal calls for the nomination to be made no later than two years prior to the electoral process. In order to shield the position from political influences, the person occupying the post can not be a candidate until the second election cycle following his or her separation from the post. Aiding the Secretary will be three regional coordinating offices, that of finance and innovation and new media strategy organizers.
Each new coordinator will report directly to the secretary, who will then pass on the information to the PDP Governing Board for action.
The base of the decisional structure is composed of the party’s serving mayors, municipal committee presidents, the regional youth organization leader, the president of the women’s group, municipal legislators, electoral coordinators, sitting state legislators and the coordinator of public workers.
Both the public workers and the regional youth coordinator are new posts. The proposed organization will have representatives from all 78 island’s municipalities.
Each new municipal coordinator will report to one of 12 regional presidencies, who, in turn, will report to the national president for the organization.
To provide a solid financing foundation, the party is restructuring the financing director office. The plan calls for a complete coordination between each candidate’s campaign finance officer and the party’s financial officer.
The creation of the women-only vice-presidency is another novel concept by the seven-decade old party.
It is believed that Reps. Carmen "Yulín" Cruz and Brenda López de Arrarás are vying for the spot.
Cruz confirmed her aspirations.
“Since 2005 when the Popular Women Organization presented the concept of a party’s vice-presidency to be occupied by a woman, we have supported it. When the proposal is ratified we will be viewing for that position,” Cruz said.
Meanwhile, the PDP’s most thorny issue, — the enhancement of the current commonwealth status — is under discussion.
There’s a veil of secrecy surrounding the meetings of the status Committee, but Cruz, who is part of the group, confirmed that a final report on their discussions should be available by January.
The new definition of enhancement would be centered on the basis of three premises, argued Cruz.
One is that the commonwealth should not be considered a colonial or territorial status, as is currently is. The other is that it maintains a viable political association with the United States and that the U.S. citizenship would be guaranteed for further generations.
“We are in the process of finalizing the details. There’s already a preliminary document ready on the basis of enhancement that included the development of the economy and political powers under the commonwealth,” Cruz said.
In announcing the changes, Rep. Jaime Perelló, Chairman of the PDP Special Rules Committee, gave his first profound endorsement of García Padilla as his party’s next gubernatorial candidate.
Among the changes in the new platform are the creation of 12 new regional directorates and the introduction of a women-only vice-presidency.
Other institutions created by Perelló’s proposal are the Auxiliary Theme Secretaries which would concentrate the resources of health, security issues, economic and education in separate organizations.
The Committee also called for the introduction of an Auxiliary Professional Youth Secretary as well as the development of 16 sectoral organizations to include experts in the fields of the environment, agriculture, labor issues, sports, and handicapped persons.
“We started this work more than a year ago with visits to the base of the party. In fact, this new proposal placed the organization structure of the party closer to the base, which included the special communities, among other sectors,” Perello said.
According to the freshman lawmaker, the new organizational model would fundamentally alter the structure of the island’s oldest political institution.
The proposal now has to be approved by the PDP Governmental Board, which seems like a "slam dunk."
After their approval, the platform would need to be ratified by the Program and Rules Assembly.
Once approved, the party would begin its re-organization effort at a General Assembly, which should be convoked no later than May.
“It’s my understanding that by April or March, the majority of the organization of the party should be completed and that includes the selection of the party’s president,” Perelló said.
The PDP lawmaker made no secret who should occupy that post in light of the 2012 elections.
“I believed that Alejandro García Padilla, who has my support, is the person who would be sitting in that position. He has done the work with the base and has been involved in the reorganization effort since the start,” Perelló said.
In an effort to provide continuity in case of a transition, the PDP would make the post of secretary general a permanent one with a term limit of four years.
The party president will nominate the person, who will then have to be confirmed by the governing board.
The Committee’s proposal calls for the nomination to be made no later than two years prior to the electoral process. In order to shield the position from political influences, the person occupying the post can not be a candidate until the second election cycle following his or her separation from the post. Aiding the Secretary will be three regional coordinating offices, that of finance and innovation and new media strategy organizers.
Each new coordinator will report directly to the secretary, who will then pass on the information to the PDP Governing Board for action.
The base of the decisional structure is composed of the party’s serving mayors, municipal committee presidents, the regional youth organization leader, the president of the women’s group, municipal legislators, electoral coordinators, sitting state legislators and the coordinator of public workers.
Both the public workers and the regional youth coordinator are new posts. The proposed organization will have representatives from all 78 island’s municipalities.
Each new municipal coordinator will report to one of 12 regional presidencies, who, in turn, will report to the national president for the organization.
To provide a solid financing foundation, the party is restructuring the financing director office. The plan calls for a complete coordination between each candidate’s campaign finance officer and the party’s financial officer.
The creation of the women-only vice-presidency is another novel concept by the seven-decade old party.
It is believed that Reps. Carmen "Yulín" Cruz and Brenda López de Arrarás are vying for the spot.
Cruz confirmed her aspirations.
“Since 2005 when the Popular Women Organization presented the concept of a party’s vice-presidency to be occupied by a woman, we have supported it. When the proposal is ratified we will be viewing for that position,” Cruz said.
Meanwhile, the PDP’s most thorny issue, — the enhancement of the current commonwealth status — is under discussion.
There’s a veil of secrecy surrounding the meetings of the status Committee, but Cruz, who is part of the group, confirmed that a final report on their discussions should be available by January.
The new definition of enhancement would be centered on the basis of three premises, argued Cruz.
One is that the commonwealth should not be considered a colonial or territorial status, as is currently is. The other is that it maintains a viable political association with the United States and that the U.S. citizenship would be guaranteed for further generations.
“We are in the process of finalizing the details. There’s already a preliminary document ready on the basis of enhancement that included the development of the economy and political powers under the commonwealth,” Cruz said.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Puerto Rico's legislator covering domestic violence?
Two Popular Democratic Party lawmakers and members of the panel investigating Rep. Luis Farinacci mingled with him the same day he called his estranged wife to allegedly threaten her.
The two, Rep. Luis Vega Ramos and Carlos ‘Charlie’ Hernández, failed to notify the Ethics Committee that they had had direct contact with the Ponce legislator just hours prior to the incident being investigated.
On July 14 at 9:46 p.m. Farinacci called his wife, Liza Yahaira Rivera, and allegedly threatened her.
The call forced Rivera’s parents to make the complaint to the Ethics Committee.
Rivera’s cellular calling record indicated that the call made by Farinacci was from Santurce, San Juan.
Farinacci told the police he had made the call from “between two sectors of Ponce.”
As members of the committee, both legislators should have told the body that they were with Farinacci hours before the call to his wife was made, but as of Wednesday, neither had notified the Committee.
According to several sources who attended the event at an Isla Verde hotel, Farinacci was seen talking to Hernández several times during the activity, attended by the entire PDP House delegation with the exception of Reps. Carmen “Yulín” Cruz and Brenda López de Arrarás.
The activity was promoted by Rep. Jaime Perelló.
López, like Vega and Hernández, is a member of the committee evaluating Farinacci’s actions.
There is also evidence that after Farinacci made the threatening telephone call to his wife, he made at least 14 other calls to friends and relatives, including a cousin, trying to enlist their help in dissuading Rivera from going to the police.
According to information obtained by the Daily Sun, at least two of the persons Farinacci called tried to convince Rivera not to go to the police with the complaint of domestic violence.
Rivera told the caller that she would go forward with the complaint because “he threatened my parents as well.”
It is strange enough that he called his wife the same day he showed up at the activity with another woman whom he introduced to at least one lawmaker as his “girlfriend.” But more information is forthcoming.
One PDP legislator who attended the event told the Daily Sun, on condition of anonymity, that there were several more “troubling actions.
“He was drinking for much of the activity. There was some strange behavior with the date he brought to the event,” said a PDP legislator.
According to three sources, Farinacci and the unnamed “girlfriend” had a falling out at the event.
“I hear that he (Farinacci) told another lawmaker that he had a problem with the woman he took to the activity,” said a PDP representative who wished to remain anonymous.
Sources said that Rep. Lydia Méndez also heard the same story at the event.
Farinacci also received a call at 3:30 that afternoon from the now ex-legislator Iván Rodríguez Traverzo, one of his closest friends.
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